D.G. Shustrov

The bodies of the constitutional review inevitably come into contact with politics in the process of review of constitutional amendments. They can either prevent unconstitutional amendments or provoke a political crisis. The article provides and analyzes examples of judicial restraint and judicial activism in exercising of judicial review over amendments to the constitution.

Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation is not endowed with special powers for judicial review over the reform of the Russian Constitution, but in practice it expressed a number of positions on the fundamental impossibility of exercising review in some cases, as well as the possibilities and limits of review in others. The article analyzes the practice of the Constitutional Court and makes suggestions for endowing the Constitutional Court with this authority.

The concept of interpretation in constitutional law covers a wide range of meanings, each of which relates the definition of the meaning of the text to solution of a particular task, and to performance of a certain function. Defining the meaning of a text means not only to know, describe and explain, to solve and apply, but also to observe interpretation rules, be a participant or observer of the interpretation process, enter into an interpretation dialogue, and in some cases, concretize, develop and even shape the law.

The article reveals the concept of constitutional identity, as well as analyzes the internal and external legal functions of the doctrine of constitutional identity. Constitutional identity is a fundamental quality of the constitution, pointing to its self-identity, it is formalized in a number of constitutional provisions and principles that characterize the basic feature of the constitution and cannot be amend within the framework of its action. The doctrine of constitutional identity performs in the internal and external functions, which are associated with ensuring the material limits of constitutional amendments: the first protects the constitution from unconstitutional amendments; the second protects the constitution from being changed by international law.

Constitutional amendment rules fix the procedure of constitutional reform and also establish the formal and material limits of constitutional changes. These are one of the most important constitutional norms, because on their ground the rest of the constitutional norms are changed and even performed the adoption of a new constitution. Moreover, the validity of the constitution itself largely depends on constitutional amendment rules. Hart’s theory of primary and secondary norms helps to understand the constitutional nature of constitutional amendment rules, which perform the function of substantiating the validity of constitution changes. In this article, constitutional amendment rules are considered precisely as secondary constitutional norms. The article also substantiates the thesis that constitutional amendment rules should be changed only together with the adoption of a new constitution, since these are norms that determine the validity of other constitutional norms. When constitutional amendment rules are changed, arises a paradox of self-amendment (A. Ross), which leads to a formal logical error of self-reference. The paradox of self-amendment confirms that constitutional amendment rules must remain unchanged within the framework of the constitution. Constitutional amendment rules can only be changed by complete constitutional revision or constitutional revolution.

Constitutional revolution is an order of constitutional change, the validity of which is not based on the current constitution, does not comply with its norms, and is not carried out in accordance with the procedures enshrined in the constitution. When the constitutional revolution is carried out, the limits of changing the previous constitution are violated and constitutional review over their observance is not carried out or to no avail. There are two theories that explain the validity of the constitution adopted as a result of the constitutional revolution: the theory of external legitimacy and the theory of internal legality. The theory of external legitimacy assumes that the basis for the validity of the constitution is external source: God, the people, a charismatic leader, etc. The validity of the constitution is not subordinate to it itself, but has an extra-constitutional source of origin. The new constitution receives from this external source its legitimacy, which makes up for the legality lost as a result of the revolution. The theory of internal legality assumes that the basis for the validity of a constitution can only be an internal source — the constitution itself. The new constitution finds its validity from itself. On the one hand, this approach is logically contradictory, since it is self-referential and explains the phenomenon by referring to itself. On the other hand, it excludes a transcendental and other objectively unverifiable explanation of the constitution. The validity of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, adopted as a result of the constitutional revolution of 1993, is based on the theory of external legitimacy, which links the validity of the constitution with its effectiveness.