Alexey G. Sushkevich

Within the framework of the common economic space of the EAEU, the elimination of violations of competition rules is carried out by five national antimonopoly authorities, as well as the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC). The criteria and rules for determining the competence of each of these bodies, established in the Treaty on the EAEU and in national legislation, do not allow for unambiguous, prompt and unmistakable identification of the competent antimonopoly authority before the start of the investigation. The author analyzes the shortcomings of the concept of cross-border markets, as well as special conditions differentiated by types of violations that are used to establish the competence of the EEC to conduct an investigation, and also substantiates the fundamental impracticability of the procedure for justifying its own competence by the national antimonopoly authority, since it initially requires a reliable exclusion of the fact that the case of anticompetitive behavior under consideration is within the competence of the EEC. Based on the generalization of the shortcomings of the existing system for determining the competent authority, with the involvement of the practice of the European Union, the article provides recommendations for improving the criteria and procedure for determining the competence of the EEC and national antimonopoly authorities: the need for criteria for determining the competent authority based on the signs of a possible violation, as well as from publicly available information about the potential violator and the relevant market is substantiated. In addition, instead of the existing one, a procedure for the joint establishment of competent authority is proposed, which will make it possible to avoid disputes about the competence and jurisdiction of cases. Within the framework of the common economic space of the EAEU, the elimination of violations of competition rules is carried out by five national antimonopoly authorities, as well as the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC). The criteria and rules for determining the competence of each of these bodies, established in the Treaty on the EAEU and in national legislation, do not allow for unambiguous, prompt and unmistakable identification of the competent antimonopoly authority before the start of the investigation. The author analyzes the shortcomings of the concept of cross-border markets, as well as special conditions differentiated by types of violations that are used to establish the competence of the EEC to conduct an investigation, and also substantiates the fundamental impracticability of the procedure for justifying its own competence by the national antimonopoly authority, since it initially requires a reliable exclusion of the fact that the case of anticompetitive behavior under consideration is within the competence of the EEC. Based on the generalization of the shortcomings of the existing system for determining the competent authority, with the involvement of the practice of the European Union, the article provides recommendations for improving the criteria and procedure for determining the competence of the EEC and national antimonopoly authorities: the need for criteria for determining the competent authority based on the signs of a possible violation, as well as from publicly available information about the potential violator and the relevant market is substantiated. In addition, instead of the existing one, a procedure for the joint establishment of competent authority is proposed, which will make it possible to avoid disputes about the competence and jurisdiction of cases.