Troitskaya A.A.

The article analyzes one of the aspects of the application of the comparative method in constitutional studies — the choice of comparison objects. It is substantiated that the involvement of certain sources of law and legal science is determined not only by comparison purposes, but also by basic approaches (dogmatic, functional, contextual) to the application of the comparative method. Schemes of different types of comparison depending on the choice of objects (by similarity / contrast, horizontal / vertical, with a narrow / wide range of involved cases) are presented and illustrated by the example of a study of the principles of territorial organization of power.

The review discusses a recent publication dedicated to the history of the Russian Constitution Court, its formation and evolution. The book is one-of-a-kind in the sense that it meticulously reveals the stages of transformation of constitutional justice in Russia. The authors present a rich historical and legal material — from the Orders of Catherine II, inspired by the ideas of the Enlightenment, until the aftermath of the constitutional reform 2020 — in a lively and thrilling manner. A balanced academic approach has enabled the authors to demonstrate the whole variety of viewpoints that exist in the literature regarding various aspects of the formation, organization and activities of the Constitutional Court of Russia. Overall, the book shows the specific features of the Russian model of constitutional justice, its role in the legal order and the peculiarities of its interaction with other actors. The book raises questions regarding the meaning and consequences of numerous transformations of the system of constitutional review that have taken place in Russia. Particularly, it identifies the risks associated with the large-scale reform of 2020, and highlights the challenges that the Court is facing in the aftermath of the latest transformation.

The category of constitutional identity is now confidently used in the science of constitutional law and in resolving some disputes, but it remains not completely clear. The article is aimed at identifying the content of this category and the possibility of its application in practice. The article presents the meanings of the term “identity” and checks whether this term can be used in constitutional law, and if so, in what sense. Possible ways of finding the features of constitutional identity in the texts of constitutions (in preambles, among the foundations of the constitutional system, or provisions protected from change) are shown. The final conclusions concern the limits of the application of constitutional identity in constitutional disputes. It seems that constitutional identity can be used to resolve constitutional conflicts only if two conditions are met: fixing the features of constitutional identity, defined precisely as such (1), and carried out previously, not at the time of the decision, but in advance (2). It is these two conditions that will provide the necessary predictability and validity of decisions, in the adoption of which the category of constitutional identity was used for argumentation. Otherwise (if these conditions are not observed for whatever reason), the constitutional review body should, as far as possible, avoid using the category “constitutional identity” as an argument in resolving disputes.