A.A. Shvets

Experience has shown that the need to resolve some political challenge often encourages the authorities to establish and/or apply procedural rules of constitutional law on an ad hoc basis. For example, special procedures can be designed to resolve a particular situation often bypassing existing procedural rules of constitutional law. Paradoxically, such actions are not considered as a violation, even if their legitimacy had been challenged before the court. The question is whether such a deviation from the existing procedural order can be justified? In seeking the answer to this question, the article attempts, firstly, to summarize and classify the relevant global constitutional practice of circumvention of formal procedural rules on an ad hoc basis and, secondly, to identify its patterns. The findings could form the basis of a new rational approach providing a flexible response to the possible inadequacy of existing constitutional procedures to address unpredictable challenges with due respect for the rule of law.