Dmitry I. Dedov

This message is devoted to the memory of the respected professor of the Department of Constitutional and Municipal Law August Alekseevich Mishin, his approaches to the study of law. These approaches helped students and colleagues to find key factors in assessing trends in the development of constitutionalism in foreign countries, to find shortcomings and assess the merits. On this basis, a message was made and a legal analysis of the approaches and decisions of the Supreme Court of the state was carried out. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin and the Supreme Court of United States in the case of Johnson v. Wisconsin Elections Commission on changing the map of electoral districts due to the fact that the executive branch presented by the governor from the Democratic Party and the representatives of the state legislature dominated by Republicans could not agree on this issue. Based on the results of the analysis, it is concluded that there are no clear standards for the American courts to conduct a comprehensive analysis of all circumstances due to the pressure exerted by those who form the American doctrine of constitutionalism. Thanks to the scientific report, it is possible to take a closer look at the process of involving the courts in political activities, the place of the court in the system of separation of powers and the conditions for the interaction of the court with other branches of power from the point of view of constitutional law.

The article provides a comparative analysis of the consideration of the sovereignty of the state from the point of view of international and constitutional law. The differences in understanding the impact of international law and constitutional norms on sovereignty are highlighted and erroneous approaches to this issue are identified, which consist in seeking recognition of the limitation of state sovereignty, denying its constitutional origin and the result of the institutionalization of national sovereignty and statehood. Thus, the author comes to conclusions about the application of completely different criteria to the assessment of sovereignty by international and constitutional law. The author finds no reason to conclude that sovereignty is limited both in international relations, for example, when joining an international organization, and in constitutional relations from the point of view of constitutionalism. From this point of view, the author examines and compares existing approaches to the reception of international law norms in the national legal system in a new way. The author comes to conclusion that, considering modern trends in the development of law, the theoretical concepts of monism and dualism do not exist in their pure form in practice, regardless of which approach to the reception of international law norms is fixed at the constitutional level.