The impact of the principles of legal regulation of party relations on the constitutionalization of Russian political parties

Abstract

The paper compares the relativistic and absolutist-idealistic philosophical and legal concepts of the outstanding German jurist G. Radbruch with each other. Starting as a relativist (although admitting the methodological «skeleton» of law in the person of three basic principles: justice, stability and expediency), G. Radbruch ends by rejecting comprehensive relativism and recognizing methodological justice as a property that distinguishes legal categories from non-legal ones. The post-war, absolute-idealist conception loses significantly in the detailing of its main provisions and contains internal contradictions. Contrary to G. Radbruch’s aspiration to give law an a priori substantive beginning, this approach is again reduced to relativism of the purpose of law. The natural-law principles proved by practice can later be disproved by it. Despite the crude nature of the theory, the late G. Radbruch’s rejection of the position that the form of law inevitably testifies to the legal character of a phenomenon had a significant impact on the development of the philosophy of law in Western Europe and the English-speaking world. The increased interest to it is generated both by the unfinished character of the theory (which creates a fruitful field for further work for other theorists of various directions) and by deep analysis of fundamental problems of law, to the study of which G. Radbruch devoted his life. The relevance of the work is due to the continuing need to develop a methodology for understanding legal phenomena, unresolved problems of auditing malicious legislation and ensuring the observance of objectivity in conducting international tribunals.

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