The concept of the Sovereign in J. Austin’s theory

Abstract

The paper considers the interpretation of the problem of sovereign power proposed by John Austin. According to the jurist, political power is a neutral force, similar to the objective forces of nature and abstracted from social relations. The abstract idea of power, being the “soul” of political communication, has a conditionally independent existence. Its effect on the actual relations is possible only insofar as it turns out to be “reified” and “personified”. The power remains in a “dormant” state in the institutions of the state and its head (sovereign), who is responsible for the reproduction of the political and legal plane, legal and social order. The article analyzes the essence of political power in the concept of J. Austin, a number of features that could characterize, in his opinion, any sovereign power, and especially emphasizes the most vulnerable place in his teaching — the feature of the “determinateness” of the sovereign. In conclusion, the author summarizes that, firstly, in the theory of J. Austin it is unclear who exactly acts as the “true” bearer of the properties of sovereignty, secondly, if it is impossible to determine the “party of sovereignty”, or it is extremely difficult to determine it, then the theory under consideration that is trying to operate empirical facts should be considered as inconsistent with reality.

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